We present a modular approach to defining logics for a wide variety of state-based systems. The systems are modelled as coalgebras, and we use modal logics to specify their observable properties. We show that the syntax, semantics and proof systems associated to such logics can all be derived in a modular fashion. Moreover, we show that the logics thus obtained inherit soundness, completeness and expressiveness properties from their building blocks. We apply these techniques to derive sound, complete and expressive logics for a wide variety of probabilistic systems, for which no complete axiomatisation has been obtained so far.
Introduction
Modularity has been a key concern in software engineering since the conception of the discipline [22] . This paper investigates modularity not in the context of building software systems, but in connection with specifying and reasoning about systems. Our work focuses on reactive systems, which are modelled as coalgebras over the category of sets and functions. The coalgebraic approach provides a uniform framework for modelling state-based and reactive systems [28] . In particular, coalgebras provide models for a large class of probabilistic systems, as shown by the recent survey [3] , which discusses the coalgebraic modelling of eight different types of probabilistic systems.
In the coalgebraic approach, a system consists of a state space C and a function γ : C → T C, which maps every state c ∈ C to the observations γ(c) that can be made of c after one transition step. Different types of systems can then be represented by varying the type T of observations. A closer look at the coalgebraic modelling of state-based and reactive systems reveals that, in nearly all cases of interest, the type T of observations arises as the composite of a small number of basic constructs.
The main goal of this paper is to lift this compositionality which exists at the level of observations to the level of specification logics and proof systems. That is, we associate a specification logic and a proof system to every basic type construct, and show how to obtain specification logics and proof systems for a combination of constructs, in terms of the ingredients of the construction. Our main technical contribution is the study of the properties which are preserved by a combination of logics and proof systems. On the side of logics, we isolate a property which ensures that combined logics have the Hennessy-Milner property w.r.t. behavioural equivalence, that is, the logical equivalence of states coincides with behavioural equivalence. Since this property is present in all of the basic constructs and is preserved by each combination of constructs, we automatically obtain expressive specification logics for a large class of systems. Concerning proof systems, our main interests are the soundness and completeness of the combined logical systems. In order to guarantee both, we investigate conditions which ensure that soundness and completeness of a combination of logics are inherited from the corresponding properties of the ingredients of the construction. Again, we demonstrate that this property is present in all basic building blocks.
As an immediate application of our compositional approach, we obtain sound, complete and expressive specification logics for a large class of probabilistic system types. While the Hennessy-Milner property has already been established for a number of such logics [19, 13, 9] , sound and complete axiomatisations for these logics have only been studied for a simple type of probabilistic systems, namely unlabelled probabilistic transition systems [10] . The modular approach presented in this paper allows us to also derive a completeness result for the probabilistic modal logic of [13] (interpreted over Segala's simple probabilistic automata [29] ), as well as a logic with a sound and complete axiomatisation for Segala's general probabilistic automata [29] .
Our main technical tool to establish the above results is the systematic exploitation of the fact that coalgebras model the one-step behaviour of systems, i.e. that one application of the coalgebra map allows us to extract information about one transition step of the system being modelled. This one-step behaviour of systems is parallelled both on the level of specification logics and on the level of proof systems. Regarding specification logics, we introduce the notion of syntax constructor, which specifies a set of syntactic features allow-ing the formulation of assertions about the next transition step of a system. The notion of one-step semantics then specifies how to interpret these syntactic features over the next transition step. Finally, a proof system constructor specifies how one can infer judgements about the next transition step.
These notions are used to make assertions about the global system behaviour, by viewing this behaviour as the stratification of the observations which can be made after a (finite) number of transition steps. This is again parallelled both on the level of logics and on the level of proof systems. Completeness, for example, can be established by isolating the corresponding one-step notion, which we call one-step completeness, and proving by induction on the number of transition steps that one-step completeness entails completeness in the ordinary sense. Expressiveness and soundness are treated similarly by considering the associated notions of one-step expressiveness and one-step soundness. When combining the logics, we combine the syntax constructors, the associated one-step semantics and the proof system constructors, and show that such combinations preserve one-step soundness, completeness and expressiveness.
Our approach generalises previous work on coalgebraic modal logic, including the abstract coalgebraic logic of Moss [21] , and the concrete logics for coalgebras proposed in [17, 27, 11] . In particular, our approach provides logics with sound and complete axiomatisations for probabilistic models. Moreover, thanks to the modular treatment of languages and their associated semantics, our logics are easily extensible to accommodate more features of state-based systems. A consequence of this wider generality is that our logics fail to be strongly complete, and accordingly our treatment is focused on weak completeness instead.
Regarding further work, we plan to extend our approach to more expressive logics, in particular to coalgebraic versions of CTL [7] and of the modal µ-calculus [16] . Also, it remains to be explored in what way our setup induces logics for programming languages with coalgebraically defined semantics [30, 14, 2] .
Preliminaries and Notation
We denote the category of sets and functions by Set, and pick a final object 1 = { * }. Binary products (coproducts) in Set are written X 1 × X 2 (X 1 + X 2 ), with canonical projections π i : X 1 × X 2 → X i (canonical injections ι i : X i → X 1 + X 2 ) for i = 1, 2. If R ⊆ X 1 × X 2 is a relation and T : Set → Set is an endofunctor, we write T R ⊆ T X 1 × T X 2 for the relation defined by t 1 (T R) t 2 if there exists w ∈ T R such that T π 1 (w) = t 1 and T π 2 (w) = t 2 . Finally, the set of functions from Y to X is denoted by X Y . We write M : Set → Set for the (inclusion-preserving) functor taking a set A (of atoms) to the set of propositional formulas built from atoms in A together with the propositional constant false (ff), by closing under implication (→). The remaining propositional connectives can be defined on M A in terms of ff and → in the usual way.
We use endofunctors T : Set → Set, subsequently referred to as signature functors, to specify particular system types. A signature functor T specifies the structure of the information which can be observed of the system states in one step. Systems themselves are modelled as T -coalgebras.
Definition 1 (Coalgebras, morphisms) A T -coalgebra is a pair (C, γ) with C a set (the carrier or state space of the coalgebra) and γ : C → T C a function (the coalgebra map, or transition structure). A T -coalgebra morphism
The category of T -coalgebras and T -coalgebra morphisms is denoted by CoAlg(T ).
For (C, γ) ∈ CoAlg(T ), the transition structure γ determines the observations γ(c) ∈ T C which can be made from a state c ∈ C in one transition step. Morphisms between coalgebras preserve this one-step behaviour. The next example shows that coalgebras can be used to model a wide variety of statebased systems, including non-deterministic and probabilistic ones: [19] (see [8] for details). These have also been called reactive probabilistic systems in [31] , and are different from the probabilistic transition systems considered in [13] , which are treated next. (4) The simple and general probabilistic automata of [29] [13] .
Note that all the endofunctors in the previous example arise as combinations of a small number of simple functors (constant, identity, powerset and probability distribution functor) using products, coproducts, exponentiation with constant sets and composition. A recent survey of existing probabilistic models of systems [3] identified no less than eight probabilistic system types of interest, all of which can be written as such combinations. This paper derives logics and proof systems for these probabilistic system types, using similar combinations on the logical level.
Apart from making this kind of compositionality explicit, the coalgebraic approach also allows a uniform definition of behavioural equivalence, which specialises to standard notions of equivalence in many important examples.
Any T -coalgebra (C, γ) induces an ω-indexed sequence of maps γ n : C → T n 1, where T n denotes the n-fold application of the signature functor T . The maps γ n are defined by induction on n: γ 0 : C → 1 is the unique such map, and γ n+1 = T γ n • γ for n ∈ ω. Intuitively, T n 1 contains all possible T -behaviours observable through n unfoldings of the coalgebra structure, while γ n maps states of the coalgebra to their n-step observable behaviour. A notion of observational equivalence which only takes finitely observable behaviour into account can now be defined as follows:
Remark 5 The notion of ω-behavioural equivalence is strictly weaker than behavioural equivalence. However, for endofunctors whose final sequence stabilises in at most ω + ω steps, the two notions coincide (see [32, 25] ). The class of endofunctors with this property includes the ω-accessible ones, and is closed under arbitrary coproducts of functors, as well as under I-indexed limits of functors, with I a small category [32] .
As a result, ω-behavioural equivalence coincides with behavioural equivalence both in the case of image-finite transition systems, and in the case of prob-abilistic transition systems (with each of the functors P ω A
and (1 + D)
A being obtained as a limit of ω-accessible functors). It is often possible to define finitary logics for which logical equivalence coincides with ω-behavioural equivalence. On the other hand, we can not in general hope to characterise behavioural equivalence by a logic with finitary syntax.
It can also be shown that, for weak pullback preserving endofunctors, the notion of behavioural equivalence coincides with the span-based notion of coalgebraic bisimilarity, as defined by Aczel and Mendler [1] and studied by Rutten [28] . All functors considered in the following are weak pullback preserving.
Definition 6 (Bisimulation, bisimilarity) A T -bisimulation between two T -coalgebras (C, γ) and (D, δ) is given by a relation R ⊆ C × D that can be equipped with a T -coalgebra structure (R, ρ) which makes the projections π
Coalgebraic bisimulation (bisimilarity) instantiates to known notions of bisimulation (bisimilarity) in concrete cases.
Example 7 We consider the system types introduced in Example 2. (1) For A-labelled transition systems, i.e. coalgebras for T X = (PX)
A , Tbisimulation coincides with Park-Milner bisimulation [23, 20] . (2) For Kripke models over the set D of propositional atoms, i.e. coalgebras for T X = PX × PD, T -bisimulation coincides with the standard notion of bisimulation, as defined e.g. in [4] .
(3) For coalgebras for T X = (1 + DX)

A
, that is, A-labelled probabilistic transition systems, T -bisimulation coincides with the notion of probabilistic bisimulation considered in [19] . (This is proved in [8] .) ( 
4) For coalgebras for T X = (PDX)
A , that is, simple probabilistic automata, T -bisimulation coincides with the stronger notion of bisimulation defined in [13] . (This is called simply bisimulation in loc. cit., in order to distinguish it from a weaker notion of equivalence referred to as probabilistic bisimulation.)
A more detailed analysis of probabilistic systems from a coalgebraic point of view can be found in [3] .
Modular Construction of Modal Languages
In this section we introduce syntax constructors and the modal languages they define. If we consider a modal language L as an extension of the basic propositional language, the idea of a syntax constructor is that it describes what needs to be added to the propositional language in order to obtain L. The important feature of syntax constructors is that they can be combined in the same way as the signature functors which define the particular shape of the systems under consideration.
After introducing the abstract concept, we give examples of some basic syntax constructors, and show how they can be combined in order to obtain more complex syntax constructors, and hence more structured modal languages.
Definition 8 (Syntax constructor, induced language) A syntax constructor is an ω-accessible endofunctor S : Set → Set which preserves inclusions, i.e. SX ⊆ SY whenever X ⊆ Y . The language L(S) associated with a syntax constructor S is the least set F (of formulas) such that
In the above definition we silently assume that, for any set X, the elements of SX are sufficiently fresh, in the sense that ff / ∈ SX and ϕ → ψ / ∈ SX whenever ϕ, ψ ∈ X.
The assumptions in Definition 8 ensure that the language associated with a syntax constructor S carries the structure of an initial L-algebra, where LX = 1 + (X × X) + SX. Of course, one could have taken L(S) as (the carrier of) the initial L-algebra directly, but the present treatment avoids abstract syntax and allows us to construct languages as least fixpoints for monotone operators on sets in the usual way.
Recall that the image SX of a set X under an inclusion-preserving and ω-accessible endofunctor S can always be reconstructed from the sets SY for finite subsets Y ⊆ X. More formally, if X is a set and x ∈ SX, we can always find a finite subset Y ⊆ X such that x ∈ SY . The requirement that SF ⊆ F in Definition 8 is therefore equivalent to SΦ ⊆ F whenever Φ is a finite subset of F . Thus, the ω-accessibility of S ensures that the construction of L(S) terminates after ω steps, that is, we are dealing with finitary languages. Technically, we often use induction on the rank (nesting depth of modal operators) of a formula as a proof principle, and ω-accessibility guarantees that the induction terminates at ω. 
where E is an arbitrary set. For syntax constructors S 1 , S 2 we let
Recall that M takes a set to the set of propositional formulas over that set. Note that the above operations are of a purely syntactical nature. The addition of the symbols [π i ], κ i and [e] will later ensure that the languages associated with S 1 ⊗ S 2 , S 1 ⊕ S 2 and S 1 E can be given a well-defined semantics.
When combining syntax constructors, we add another layer of modal operators to the syntax already defined. Closure under propositional connectives (through the application of M ) is needed to express propositional judgements also at the level on which the construction operates, e.g. to have formulas of the form
The above definition is modelled after the definition of signature functors. Languages of form L(S 1 ⊗ S 2 ) and L(S 1 ⊕ S 2 ) will be used to formalise properties of systems whose signature functors are of form T 1 × T 2 and T 1 + T 2 , respectively, while the language L(S 1 E) provides a means to reason about systems with signature functor T 1
E
. The clause dealing with the composition of syntax constructors gives rise to S 1 -modal operators which are indexed by S 2 -formulas. Alternatively, the composition of two syntax constructors can be thought of as introducing an additional sort for formulas, as illustrated in the next example.
Example 11 Suppose
Then the language L = L(S 1 S 2 ) can be described by the following grammar:
Languages of this kind have a two-layer structure, corresponding to systems that exhibit two different types of behaviour (modelled by 2 1 and 2 2 , respectively) in an alternating fashion. They are used to specify properties of systems whose signature functor T is the composition of two functors:
In order to capture all possible behaviours described by T , we first have to describe the T 2 -behaviours, and then use these descriptions to specify the observations which can be made according to T 1 . Since propositional connectives will in general be necessary to capture all possible T 2 -behaviours, the definition of the syntax constructor S 1 S 2 involves the closure under propositional connectives before applying S 1 . Thus, the introduction of new sorts in the approach of [27, 11] can be explained as the construction of logics for the composition of two signature functors.
The next proposition shows that the constructions in Definition 10 indeed give rise to syntax constructors:
PROOF. It is clear that all four constructions are inclusion-preserving and functorial. The fact that they are ω-accessible is immediate from the fact that accessibility is preserved under arbitrary coproducts and functor composition in Set, and from the accessibility of M .
In ordinary modal logic, the modal language
, where L n contains all modal formulas of rank ≤ n.
A similar characterisation holds for the language associated with an arbitrary syntax constructor. This, in particular, will allow us to use induction on the rank of formulas as a proof principle.
, we say that ϕ has rank at most n.
contains all modal formulas with modal operators in M whose nesting depth of modal operators is at most n.
The fact that L n (S) for n ∈ ω constitute a stratification of L(S) is the content of the next result.
Proposition 14
The following hold:
PROOF. While the inclusion in the first of the above statements might initially appear slightly surprising, it should be noted that the application of M introduces the constant truth values ff and tt (as ff → ff), and as a result, L n (S) also contains formulas of rank strictly smaller than n.
Induction on n and the preservation of inclusions by S and M are used to prove both the first statement and the inclusion
PROOF. The definition of L(S) gives (M •S)(L(S)) ⊆ L(S)
, while the second statement of Proposition 14 combined with induction on n prove the reverse inclusion.
For the subsequent development, it will be useful to regard the languages L n (S) as closures under boolean connectives of certain sets (of atoms).
Definition 16
The sets A n (S) of atoms of rank n, with n ∈ ω, are defined by:
Some of the properties of the sets A n (S) are given next.
Proposition 17
(S) and L(S) = M (A(S)).
PROOF. The first two statements follow by induction on n. For the third statement, the ω-accessibility of S together with Proposition 14 and the definition of A(S) are used to prove S(L(S)) ⊆ A(S), while induction on n, the preservation of inclusions by S and M , and Corollary 15 prove the reverse inclusion. A subsequent application of M and use of Corollary 15 yields
Modular Construction of Coalgebraic Semantics
In the previous section, we have argued that a syntax constructor with associated language L specifies those features which have to be added to the propositional language in order to obtain L. In standard modal logic, this boils down to adding the modal operator 2, which can be used to describe the observable behaviour after one transition step. Abstracting from this example, we now introduce the one-step semantics for a syntax constructor, which relates the additional modal structure (specified by a syntax constructor) to the observations (specified by a signature functor) which can be made of a system in one transition step. Throughout this section, S denotes a syntax constructor and T is an endofunctor. Also, we writeP : Set op → Set for the contravariant powerset functor. To simplify notation, we make no distinction between (elements of) the setPX and (elements of) the set PX.
T for a syntax constructor S w.r.t. an endofunctor T maps interpretations of L over X to interpretations of SL over T X, in such a way that whenever
d ). We omit the superscript on the one-step semantics if the endofunctor T is clear from the context.
A one-step semantics provides the glue between a language constructor S and a signature functor T .
The requirement that [[S]]
T preserves morphisms of interpretations ensures that [[S]]
T is defined uniformly on interpretations. This will subsequently guarantee that the coalgebraic semantics of the induced language L(S) is adequate w.r.t. behavioural equivalence, i.e. that behaviourally equivalent states of coalgebras cannot be distinguished using formulas of the language. 
Remark 19 Let Int be the category whose objects are interpretations and whose arrows are morphisms between interpretations. (That is, Int is the comma category
Id ↓ 2 - .) Also, let V : Int → Set ( W : Int → Set op ) take d : L → PX to L (respectively X),
and (t, f ) to t (respectively f ). A one-step semantics for S w.r.t. T can alternatively be defined as a functor [[S]]
T : Int → Int such that V • [[S]] T = S • V and W • [[S]] T = T op • W : Set S / / Set Int [[S]] T / / W V O O Int W V O O Set op T op / / SetInt [[S]] T / / V,W Int V,W Set × Set op S×T op / / Set × Set op
Lemma 20 There is a one-to-one correspondence between one-step semantics [[S]]
T for S w.r.t. T and natural transformations δ : SP ⇒PT .
PROOF. Given a one-step semantics [[S]]
T for S w.r.t. T , one can define a natural transformation δ :
T follows from the functoriality of S and the naturality of δ. Moreover, the two mappings defined above are inverse to each other.
The previous correspondence establishes a connection with the work on dualities between categories of algebras and coalgebras, see e.g. [18] , where natural transformations of the same kind are used to provide coalgebraic semantics for modal languages. A variant of the notion of one-step semantics was introduced in [5, 6] . For languages with unary modalities, a one-step semantics essentially corresponds to a choice of a predicate lifting for each modal operator; languages and proof systems arising in this way were previously studied in [24, 25] .
The key feature of a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor is that it gives rise to a semantics of L(S) w.r.t. T -coalgebras, that is, it induces a satisfaction relation between T -coalgebras and formulas of L(S). Furthermore, we can define a one-step semantics for a combination of syntax constructors in terms of some given one-step semantics for the ingredients. Before describing these constructions, we provide one-step semantics for some simple syntax constructors.
Example 21 We consider the syntax constructors introduced in Example 9. (1) Suppose D is a set. The function which maps an arbitrary interpretation to the interpretation d D : D → PD, x → {x} defines a one-step semantics for S D w.r.t. the constant functor T X = D. (2) A one-step semantics for S Id w.r.t. Id is given by
Similarly, a one-step semantics for S Pω w.r.t. P ω is given by the same formula, with slightly different types:
4) For the syntax constructor S D associated with the probability distribution functor D, we define a one-step semantics by
If T is ω-accessible and preserves inclusions and weak pullbacks, a onestep semantics for the syntax constructor S = T associated with Moss's coalgebraic logic is defined by
We now return to the claim made at the beginning of this section, and show that a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor S w.r.t. a signature functor T gives rise to an interpretation of the associated language L(S) over T -coalgebras.
Definition 22 (Coalgebraic semantics) Suppose S is a syntax constructor with one-step semantics [[S]]
T and (C, γ) ∈ CoAlg(T ). The coalgebraic seman-
is defined inductively on the structure of formulas by
where we inductively assume that
Before showing that this definition captures the standard interpretation of some known modal logics, we need to show that the coalgebraic semantics is well-defined, as we can have σ ∈ SΦ and σ ∈ SΨ for two different sets Φ, Ψ.
Lemma 23 The coalgebraic semantics of L(S) is well defined, that is, for
PROOF. The claim follows from the definition of a one-step semantics by considering the diagram
where i : Φ → Φ ∪ Ψ and j : Ψ → Φ ∪ Ψ are the inclusions.
Our definition of the coalgebraic semantics generalises the semantics of modal formulas, as well as the semantics of the formulas considered in [10] and [21] : 
with c ∈ C and ϕ ∈ L(S P ). This is the standard textbook semantics of modal logic [4] . (2) 
This agrees with the standard semantics of Moss's coalgebraic logic [21] .
The above example shows that the coalgebraic semantics specialises to known semantics in concrete cases. We now turn to the issue of combining one-step semantics, and show that we can derive a one-step semantics for a combination of syntax constructors (see Definition 10) by combining one-step semantics for the ingredients. To make notation bearable, we disregard the dependency on the signature functor.
Definition 25 (Combinations of one-step semantics
and L 2 over X 1 and X 2 , respectively, let E be an arbitrary set, and consider the functions 
The intuitions behind the definitions of
, where, for a function f : E → X, we have that f satisfies [e]ϕ iff f (e) satisfies ϕ.
Note that the presence of the ( ) operator in the definitions of
We now show that the combination of one-step semantics is well-defined.
Proposition 26 Suppose [[S i ]] is a one-step semantics for
PROOF. Straightforward unfolding of the respective definitions.
We have now seen how we can combine syntax constructors and their associated one-step semantics. This gives rise to a modular way of constructing logics for coalgebras. The following two sections present applications of this modular approach. In the next section, we show that a combination of logics has the Hennessy-Milner property if all the ingredients of the construction satisfy an expressiveness property. In the subsequent section, we show how to obtain sound and complete proof systems for a combination of logics, by suitably combining sound and complete proof systems for the building blocks.
Behavioural versus Logical Equivalence
In this section, we investigate the Hennessy-Milner property, stating that any two behaviourally equivalent points have the same logical theory, on logics arising from syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics. We introduce the notion of expressiveness for an interpretation, and show that if a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor preserves expressiveness, then the induced logic has the Hennessy-Milner property. To treat logics which arise from a combination of syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics, we show that a combination of one-step semantics preserves expressiveness if all the ingredients do. This allows us to establish the Hennessy-Milner property for combined logics in a modular fashion.
We begin with the easy part, and show that behaviourally equivalent states cannot be distinguished by formulas of a logic induced by a syntax constructor and associated one-step semantics. The remainder of this section is concerned with proving the converse of Proposition 27. To this end, we introduce the notion of one-step expressiveness, which will allow us to derive the Hennessy-Milner property for a logic induced by a syntax constructor and associated one-step semantics. Moreover, we show that this condition automatically holds for a combination of syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics, if it holds for the ingredients of the construction.
Proposition 27 Suppose S is a syntax constructor, [[S]]
The formal definition of one-step expressiveness is as follows:
The idea behind the notion of expressive interpretation is the following: if d : L → PX is expressive, then the set {d(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ L} contains enough predicates to distinguish individual elements of X. Thinking of the set Th(x) = {ϕ ∈ L | x ∈ d(ϕ)} as the theory of the point x ∈ X, then d is expressive if Th(x) = Th(x ) implies x = x for all x, x ∈ X. Now recall that the language induced by a syntax constructor S is generated by the iterated application of the functor S • M , to an empty set of atoms to begin with (Definitions 13 and 16, and Propositions 14 and 17). Thus, our concern is the preservation of expressiveness at each step. The notion of one-step expressiveness of a one-step semantics ensures that this is the case. 
The natural transformation ρ embodies the interpretation of the language given by a syntax constructor, and has been used by Klin [15] in a categorytheoretic setting, where the functor M is absorbed into the structure of the category on top of which the logic is defined. 
In what follows, we will refer to a one-step expressive one-step semantics simply as an expressive one-step semantics. Using this terminology, our first main result can be stated as follows:
In other words, the induced logic is rich enough to distinguish any two states which exhibit different behaviours in finitely many steps.
The proof of this theorem uses induction on the rank of formulas (see Definition 13). We begin by showing that a formula of rank at most n can be semantically represented by a subset of T n 1. This representation is computed by the functions d n , which we now introduce.
Definition 31
For n ∈ ω, the functions d n : A n (S) → PT n 1 with n ∈ ω are defined inductively by
is the unique such map, and
The relationship between the coalgebraic semantics of a formula ϕ ∈ L n (S) and the semantical representation d n (ϕ) is as follows:
where the functions γ n : C → T n 1 with n ∈ ω are as in Definition 4.
PROOF. Induction on n.
Using this terminology, the proof of Theorem 30 can be given as follows: Using the fact that ω-behavioural equivalence coincides with behavioural equivalence for coalgebras of a functor whose final sequence stabilises in at most ω + ω steps (see Remark 5), we have the following corollary:
Corollary 33 Suppose the final sequence of T stabilises in at most ω+ω steps and
Note that the accessibility degree of T basically limits the branching degree of T -coalgebras [25] , so the above corollary is a coalgebraic Hennessy-Milner result.
It is easy to see that the one-step semantics for all the basic syntax constructors are one-step expressive: 
Example 34 (1) Suppose D is a set. Then [[S D ]] is one-step expressive, since the interpretation d D : D → PD, x → {x} is expressive. (2) [[S Id ]] is one-step expressive. For, if d : A → PX is an expressive interpretation, and if the formula ϕ ∈ A ⊆ M A distinguishes two points x = y ∈ X (under the interpretation provided by d ), then the formula
•ϕ ∈ S Id M A also distinguishes these two points (this time under the interpretation provided by [[S Id ]](d ) ). (3) [[S P ω ]] is one-step expressive. To see this, let d : A → PX be an expressive interpretation, and let Y, Z ∈ P ω X be such that Y = Z. Say ∅ = (Y \Z) y. The expressiveness of d together with M A being closed under negation yields, for each
Alternatively, Proposition 29 can be used to derive the expressiveness of the coalgebraic semantics above, using essentially the same arguments. As the onestep semantics for all the basic syntax constructors are one-step expressive, our next goal is to show that one-step expressiveness is preserved by all the combinations of syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics. Again suppressing the dependency on the signature functor, we obtain: 
Thus, Theorem 30 applies to any combination of expressive one-step semantics. As a result, the logic induced by a combination of syntax constructors with associated expressive one-step semantics distinguishes any two states up to ω-behavioural equivalence, and in case the final sequence of T stabilises at, or before ω +ω, also up to behavioural equivalence. As an immediate application, we obtain expressive logics for all system types discussed in Example 2.
In particular, for image-finite simple probabilistic automata, we obtain a variant of the logic described in [13] which is expressive w.r.t. behavioural equivalence, and hence also w.r.t. the strong version of the notion of bisimulation considered in loc. cit. (see also Example 7).
Modular Construction of Proof Systems
This section extends the methods presented so far to also include the compositional construction of proof systems. Our main result shows that this can be done in such a way that the combined proof system inherits soundness and completeness from its building blocks. The key notion needed to modularise the construction of proof systems is that of a proof system constructor, which operates on the category of boolean theories, described next.
Definition 36
The category BTh of boolean theories is specified by the following data:
• objects are pairs (A, Φ A ) where A is a set (of atoms), and Φ A ⊆ M A is a set (of theorems over A), • morphisms f : (A, Φ
We write Π 1 : BTh → Set for the first projection functor.
It is easy to see that Π 1 is actually a fibration that arises by change of base of the fibration Pred → Set along the functor M [12] , where Pred → Set is the standard fibration of subsets over sets. The fact that Π 1 is a fibration is however inconsequential for the later development.
The idea behind an object (A, Φ A ) is that Φ A contains the set of all provable formulas over atoms in A. Note that closure under propositional reasoning and modus ponens is not required in general for boolean theories. However, there is a canonical way of transforming an arbitrary boolean theory into one which has the previously mentioned property. This is captured by the inclusionpreserving functor Cl : BTh → BTh which takes a boolean theory (A, Φ) to the boolean theory (A, Φ ), with Φ being obtained by adding all propositional tautologies over A to Φ, and closing the resulting set of formulas under modus ponens. An immediate consequence of this definition is that Cl • Cl = Cl. The boolean theories of interest in the following will be obtained by applying Cl to certain sets of axioms.
Using the category BTh of boolean theories, we can now define the notion of proof system constructor as follows.
Definition 37 (Proof system constructor) Suppose S is a syntax constructor. A proof system constructor for S is an inclusion-preserving, ω-accessible
Note that the above definition has several implications. First, it requires that P is compatible with S in the sense that the diagram
commutes, that is, P lifts S • M . The presence of M ensures that the syntax constructor is only applied to sets of formulas that are closed under boolean connectives. Second, the requirement that P is ω-accessible generalises a standard requirement in proof systems, namely that an inference rule can only contain a finite number of premises. Since P is ω-accessible, and since every BTh-object (A, Φ) is an ω-directed union of objects (C, Ψ) with C and Ψ finite, the value P(A, Φ) is determined by the values P(C, Ψ) with C a finite subset of A and Ψ a finite subset of Φ. That is, any ϕ ∈ P(A, Φ) is constructed using a finite number of atoms C ⊆ A, and is derived using a finite number of premises Ψ ⊆ Φ. The ω-accessibility of a proof system constructor will later be shown to ensure that the induced derivability predicate can be given an inductive characterisation.
The intuition behind the definition of a proof system constructor is as follows. The syntax constructor S specifies a set of modalities to be added to the basic propositional language. The functor S • M takes a set A of atoms to the set A obtained by applying the modal operators defined by S to propositional formulas over A exactly once. Now a corresponding proof system constructor takes a set of theorems over A, which contains all provable facts among propositional formulas over A, and produces a set of axioms over A . Subsequently closing these axioms together with all propositional tautologies over A under modus ponens yields a set of theorems over A , which contains all provable facts concerning the next transition step that can be derived from the given theorems over A. In other words, a proof system constructor specifies how theoremhood can be lifted to formulas containing an extra degree of nesting of the modal operators. Note that proof system constructors only axiomatise those judgements that are needed on top of propositional logic.
Since the axioms and rules of modal logic only involve formulas of rank at most one, and since the premises of these rules only involve formulas of rank zero, it is straightforward to encode the modal logic K into a proof system constructor. A similar encoding can be given for the probabilistic modal logic described in [10] . The next example describes these encodings, as well as other proof system constructors that correspond to syntax constructors defined in Example 9.
Example 38 (1) For the constant functor T X = D and the associated syntax constructor S D , we define a constant proof system constructor
and is defined by the following axioms:
(2) For the identity functor T X = X and the associated syntax constructor S Id , we define a proof system constructor P Id by
and is defined by the following axioms: 
Then, P P (P P ω ) is a proof system constructor for S P (respectively S P ω ). and 
µ(F j ). This equality is further exploited in the "conclusion" of this axiom: whenever µ(E
The functor P D : BTh → BTh defined above qualifies as a proof system constructor for S D .
We conclude this example by noting that a standard proof system consisting of the axioms and rules in the definition of P D (with replaced by ) together with the rule:
has been studied in [10] . We note, however, that by taking m = n = 1 in the last axiom defining P D , one obtains both of the following:
and therefore the additional rule used in [10] is redundant.
The previous example explains our choice of terminology as regards proof system constructors. Each of the proof system constructors in Example 38 gives rise to a standard proof system for the language induced by the corresponding syntax constructor. For example, replacing the symbol by in the axioms defining the proof system constructor P P for S P yields a set of axioms and rules for standard modal logic. Now recall that the language L(S) induced by a syntax constructor S was defined as the smallest set of formulas which is closed under the application of S, as well as under propositional connectives. Similarly, a proof system constructor P for S induces a derivability predicate on the language L(S), defined as the set of facts that can be inferred by applying P together with propositional reasoning and modus ponens.
Definition 39 (Theory induced by P) The theory induced by P, denoted (A(S), Φ P ), is the least boolean theory of the form (A(S), Φ) with the following properties:
• Cl(A(S), Φ) ⊆ (A(S), Φ), and
We write P ϕ for ϕ ∈ Φ P .
Equivalently, (A(S), Φ P ) can be characterised as the least boolean theory of the form (A(S), Φ) which satisfies
• (A(S), Φ) contains all instances of propositional tautologies, • (A(S), Φ) is closed under modus ponens, • P(A, Ψ) ⊆ (A(S), Φ) for any (A, Ψ) ⊆ (A(S), Φ) with A and Ψ finite.
Note that, since P lifts S • M , we have (
, and therefore the theory induced by P is well-typed.
We now apply our main programme also to this definition, and show that the theory induced by P can be viewed as the stratification of a sequence of boolean theories Φ n P ⊆ L n (S). This will open the road for the proof of soundness and completeness, where induction on the rank of formulas will be available as a proof technique.
Definition 40
The boolean theories (A n (S), Φ n P ) with n ∈ ω are defined by:
We write
(S) for all n ∈ ω, and therefore the boolean theories (A n (S), Φ n P ) with n ∈ ω are well-typed. Moreover, the following holds:
PROOF. Induction on n, using the fact that both Cl and P preserve inclusions.
We are now ready to give an inductive characterisation of the theory induced by P.
Proposition 42
The boolean theories (A(S), Φ P ) and
The reverse inclusion follows by structural induction over Φ P : First, any ϕ ∈ Φ P which is an instance of a propositional tautology belongs to some L n (S) = M A n (S), and hence to Φ n P . Second, if ϕ and ϕ → ψ are in Φ P , and by the induction hypothesis, also in Φ n P for some n ∈ ω, then closure of Φ n P under modus ponens gives ψ ∈ Φ n P . Finally, suppose that ϕ ∈ P(A(S), Φ P ). By ω-accessibility of P, we can assume that ϕ ∈ P(A, Ψ) for some (A, Ψ) ⊆ (A(S), Φ P ), with A and Ψ finite. By the induction hypothesis, there exists n ∈ ω such that (A, Ψ)
. This concludes the proof.
As a result of Proposition 42, we can use induction on n to prove properties of (A(S), P ). In the following, we consider soundness and completeness of (A(S), P ) w.r.t. 
t. an interpretation
A proof system constructor P for S is one-step sound ( one-step complete) w.r.t. a one-step semantics
Using induction, we can derive soundness and weak completeness in the standard way from their one-step counterparts; due to the lack of compactness, our logics usually fail to be strongly complete.
Theorem 44 (Soundness and completeness) If the proof system constructor P for S is one-step sound (complete) w.r.t. [[S]] T , then (A(S), P ) is sound (respectively complete) w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L(S), that is, |= T ϕ if (only if ) P ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(S).
PROOF. We assume that T 1 = ∅, as otherwise T X = ∅ for all X ∈ Set, and the claim is trivial. If the functions d n : A n (S) → PT n 1 with n ∈ ω are as in Definition 31, then it follows by induction on n that n P is sound (complete) w.r.t. d n for n ∈ ω. Now soundness (completeness) of (A(S), P ) w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L(S) amounts to
Thus, assuming that P is one-step sound, it follows that (A(S), ) = n∈ω (A n (S), n P ) is sound w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L(S). Now assume that P is one-step complete, and let ϕ ∈ L
and hence, using the completeness of n P w.r.t. d n , n P ϕ. Thus, P ϕ, which concludes the proof.
In the case of standard modal logic, the axioms and rules given in Example 38 (with replaced by ) together with all instances of propositional tautologies and the modus ponens and uniform substitution rules, form a sound and complete proof system. Similarly, for probabilistic transition systems, the axioms and rules given in Example 38 yield a sound and complete proof system: this was proved in [10] using the standard filtration method. However, these results are of limited usefulness here, since in order to be able to derive soundness and completeness results for more complex signature functors, defined in terms of P and D, we must prove that the proof system constructors P P and P D are one-step sound and complete.
We now establish one-step soundness and completeness for all the proof system constructors introduced in Example 38. Together with the fact that the combination of proof system constructors preserves one-step soundness and completeness (which we will establish later), this puts us in the position to apply our modular techniques to a large class of probabilistic system types, including probabilistic transition systems and probabilistic automata.
We begin with a simple technical lemma; recall that a disjunctive clause over a set A of atoms is a formula of the form a 1 ∨ · · · ∨ a m ∨ ¬a 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬a n with m, n ≥ 0 and a 1 , . . . , a m , . . . , a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A.
Lemma 45 Suppose (A, Φ A ) ∈ BTh and let (A, ) = Cl(A, Φ A ). If d : A → PX is an interpretation, the following are equivalent:
ϕ for every disjunctive clause ϕ over A.
PROOF. Follows immediately by converting every formula ϕ ∈ M A into conjunctive normal form.
We can now tackle completeness for our basic proof system constructors. PROOF. One-step soundness of both proof system constructors follows easily by unfolding their respective definitions. To show one-step completeness, we fix (A, ) that is complete w.r.t. d : A → PX.
For the one-step completeness of P D , we have to show that (Cl
. Using this notation, by Lemma 45 it suffices to show that [[
holds, we have one of three cases:
In this case, we have d∈D d, and n j=1 ψ j follows by propositional reasoning.
Then there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n with ψ j = d = ϕ 1 , and since d → d is a propositional tautology, the claim follows by propositional reasoning. This concludes the proof.
We proceed to establish one-step completeness for the powerset functor (as in [24] , but with a different proof) and the probability distribution functor.
Proposition 47
The proof system constructors P P and P . . . ,z N ) , zz =z 1 z 1 + . . . +z N z N is the usual dot product. Also, if q ∈ Q and I is an interval in Q, we write q I for the interval in Q defined by the set {q * i | i ∈ I}. We identify an element q ∈ Q with the singleton set {q} and write I < J, for I, J ⊆ Q whenever i < j for all i ∈ I and all j ∈ J. In particular, I > 0 is used as a shorthand for i > 0 for all i ∈ I. Finally, if I 1 
This can, in turn, be reduced (through propositional reasoning and the use of the second axiom in the definition of
To show this, let α 0 = 1 and ϕ 0 = tt, and consider all (finitely many) formulas of form
where each ϕ i is either ϕ i or ¬ϕ i , each ψ j is either ψ j or ¬ψ j , and such that ξ → ff. Now let Ξ contain exactly one such ξ from each equivalence class for the equivalence relation ξ ∼ ξ iff ξ ↔ ξ . Some immediate properties of Ξ are: 
The fact that Φ is maximally consistent gives:
where the first and third axioms in the definition of P D are needed to obtain the last statement. We can then apply Rockafellar's theorem to the subspace
where ξ ranges over Ξ, and to the intervals I ζ defined by (x) ), and moreover, satisfies all formulas in Φ: we pick x ξ ∈ d(ξ) = ∅ (as ξ ff and (A, ) is complete w.r.t. d) for each ξ ∈ Ξ, and define µ(x ξ ) = v ξ for each ξ ∈ Ξ, and µ(x) = 0 elsewhere. The properties of Ξ mentioned earlier together with the soundness of (A, ) w.r.t. d ensure that µ is a probability distribution:
v ξ = v ϕ , and similarly for ψ ∈ {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n }. Finally, the fact that µ satisfies all formulas in Φ follows by case analysis on the basic formulas in Φ: • The cases of M α ζ ∈ Φ and ¬M α ζ ∈ Φ are treated similarly.
• The cases of E α ζ ∈ Φ and ¬E α ζ ∈ Φ are treated using the definition of 
By manipulating these (in)equalities, namely multiplying by the least common denominator of the a ζ s and separating positive coefficients from negative ones, we obtain non-negative integer values b ζ and b ζ , with ζ ∈ {ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ m } ∪ {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ∪ Ξ, such that:
We then define the formulas
Moreover, the following hold:
(1)
To see why the statement in item 1 above is true, note that the equality ( (1) gives the equality of the previously-mentioned functions on the value x. As a result, we have d (ζ
The inequality in item 2 above follows directly from the inequality (2), after recalling that I ζ is either the set {m ζ } or the open interval (m ζ , M ζ ), and hence the lower endpoint of the interval 
As also L q ζ 1 ∈ Φ, we have arrived at the required contradiction also under the second alternative. This concludes the proof.
We note that, while the proof of one-step completeness of P D resembles the completeness proof in [10] (which also uses Rockafellar's theorem), the onestep completeness of P D will, in addition, allow the modular derivation of completeness results for functor combinations.
In what follows, we show how one can combine proof system constructors for simple languages in order to derive proof systems constructors, and hence proof systems, for more complex languages. Moreover, we show that whenever the building blocks of such constructions are one-step sound and complete w.r.t. some given one-step semantics, the resulting proof systems are sound and complete w.r.t. the induced coalgebraic semantics. For ease of exposition, we abbreviate [
Definition 50 (Combinations of proof system constructors) Let (A 1 , 1 ) and (A 2 , 2 ) be boolean theories. 
If P 1 and P 2 are proof system constructors for S 1 and S 2 , respectively, define:
We note in passing that, in the case of ⊗ and E , the axiomatisations used here have been chosen so as to minimise the number of axioms required. An alternative, equivalent axiomatisation for ⊗ , which is closer in spirit to the definition of ⊕ , can be given by replacing the first two axioms in the definition of ⊗ by:
(and similarly for E ).
With these definitions, we obtain that one-step soundness and completeness are preserved by combinations of proof system constructors; for readability we have suppressed the dependency of the one-step semantics on the signature functor.
Proposition 51 Suppose P i is a proof system constructor for S i , for i = 1, 2, and E is an arbitrary set. Then, P 1 ⊗ P 2 , P 1 ⊕ P 2 , P 1 E and P 1 P 2 are proof system constructors for PROOF. It is immediate from the definitions that P 1 ⊗ P 2 , P 1 ⊕ P 2 , P 1 E and P 1 P 2 are proof system constructors. Also, the one-step soundness and completeness of P 1 P 2 follows directly from the definitions.
Checking the one-step soundness of P 1 ⊗ P 2 , P 1 ⊕ P 2 and P 1 E is just a matter of unfolding the respective definitions. For the one-step completeness of P 1 ⊗ P 2 , P 1 ⊕ P 2 and P 1 E, we assume that P i is one-step complete w.r. T i is a one-step semantics for S i w.r.t. the endofunctor T i , for i = 1, 2. Throughout the proof, we fix (A, ) ∈ BTh complete w.r.t. d : A → PX. We write P for the entailment relation on (Cl • P)(A, ), whenever P is a proof system constructor.
We first consider the one-step completeness of P 1 ⊗ P 2 w.r. 
where D and E are arbitrary sets.
We can therefore use Propositions 12, 26, 35 and 51 to derive, for any (probabilistic) system type of the above form, a logic which is sound and complete, and which is also expressive provided that the unbounded powerset functor is not used in the signature functor.
Example 52 (Probabilistic automata) Simple probabilistic automata [29] are modelled coalgebraically using the functor T = (P • D) E . The language L 1 = L(T ) obtained by applying the modular techniques presented in Section 3 can be described by the following grammar:
The coalgebraic semantics 
Conclusions
We have studied modular construction principles for coalgebraic logics. When modelling systems coalgebraically, one typically constructs an endofunctor that represents the behaviour of the associated class of systems from a small number of basic ingredients, such as constants, powersets and probability distributions, by means of a small number of operations, viz products, coproducts and functor composition. We have demonstrated that this modular approach carries over to the associated logics. On the logical side, every endofunctor is paired with a proof system constructor, and operations on endofunctors such as products and functor composition give rise to corresponding operations on proof system constructors. By showing that the basic ingredients admit a (sound and) complete proof system, we have shown (soundness and) completeness for combined systems by showing that the operations on proof system constructors preserve (soundness and) completeness. In this way, we have obtained (sound and) complete logics for a wide range of state based systems, in particular for the probabilistic automata of [29] , for which completeness was hitherto an open question.
